Just a small introduction. About a week or so ago I sent an email to some of you (well, a good number), just because I was thinking about the horrors of the war in Ukraine. I had just finished working through and teaching Gregg Caruso's engaging book with Daniel Dennett, and it got me to thinking about how a moral responsibility skeptic would conceptualize the behavior of Putin and our appropriate reactions to it. Somewhat provocatively, and in a sour mood (induced often these days by the very, very terrible things going on in this war--and other things), I contended that Putin deserved the severest possible blame and punishment. In a flourish (gratuitous, but I felt inclined to it), I stated that I believed that Putin deserved to be tortured and then put to death. Ok, I'm not sure about the "tortured" part, but I do think that he deserves the very worst possible treatment (compatibly with our moral constraints, if adding this is not question-begging). How many people in the civilized (and even uncivilized) world would deny this. And yet it seemed to me entailed by moral responsibility skepticism of the sort defended by some of my very best friends in philosophy--great philosophers like Derk Pereboom. (But I also realized that I was perhaps not being ideally careful or charitable--just blowing off metaphysical steam, as it were.) There ensued a discussion (which I cannot summarize here), but now I add:
As Eddy pointed out (in our email discussion of an aspect of some versions of moral responsibility skepticism), Putin is not exactly destitute. Apparently he has about 200 billion or more USD squirreled away in a complex shell-game. Hiding this amount of money takes a lot of savvy, if only to hire the best "wealth management" consultants!! Did he grow up in grinding poverty? Not to my knowledge. My presumption is that he is fully morally responsible, and deserves to be blamed and treated harshly to the fullest extent possible.
Ok but that's a defeasible presumption, as suggested in email conversation with some of you. K. On my view, to be morally responsible, Putin must have the capacity for guidance control. He is morally responsible for (say) an action only if he owns the reasons-responsive process from which it issues. Guidance control is owned reasons-sensitivity (to put it over-simply). As I wrote above, my presumption is that Putin does have the relevant capacity (and also the required epistemic capacity).
But, let's suppose that despite his not-quite-destitute financial situation, and perhaps at least minimally decent upbringing, he is (for whatever reason this happens) a genuine psychopath. I think this would imply that he can't grasp moral reasons, although he clearly grasps prudential reasons. Given that one must have the capacity to grasp moral reasons to be morally responsible, if this highly implausible scenario were to obtain (i.e., Putin were unable to grasp moral reasons), then he would not be morally responsible, and would not deserve blame or punishment. Blame involves moral condemnation, and punishment is (among other things) harsh treatment that symbolizes the state's moral condemnation.
Just to try out an idea (and I've only had one cup of coffee), maybe (assuming psychopathy) Putin does not deserve moral blame--he does not "speak the language" of blame/punishment. This is the language of reasons, including moral reasons. It doesn't make sense to speak to such an individual in a language they don't and can't speak. But punishment involves at least two components: blame (symbolic expression of indignation) and harsh treatment. Perhaps then we could consider the presumptive psychopathic Putin to be fully deserving of the harshest possible treatment (he does speak the language of prudential reasons). The harsh treatment would not symbolize moral condemnation, but would be fully deserved (or if you prefer, fully appropriate/justified, all-things-considered). We could justifiably kick the shit out of him, and put him down like an animal.
Well, I don't myself doubt that Putin can grasp moral reasons, in addition to possessing a stunning (and cunning) capacity for prudence. But it must be admitted that psychopaths sometimes have startling lapses in their prudence, so there is at least some evidence that he is one, in addition to his apparently uncaring brutality. Still, as I wrote above, we would be totally justified in treating him as harshly as he has caused others to be treated (to the extent possible, which is only a tiny bit).
Now for my second cup of coffee. Maybe with this assistance, I can figure out (and articulate) how someone could deserve (which I take to be a moral notion) harsh treatment (and not mere sequestration), but not in virtue of doing something blameworthy. Also, perhaps I'll be caffeine-empowered to explain how it could be appropriate (or justified) all-things-considered to so treat someone not blameworthy. I hope the ideas sketched above will be deemed incomplete, rather than totally incoherent. Strict liability for genocide? Help wanted, and who better to ask than my friends on this blog.
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