Here is the main argument.
- Arguments for free will skepticism are no better or worse than arguments for epistemological skepticism.
- If any argument for epistemological skepticism is cogent, then among the things we don’t know is that we don’t know that we don’t have free will.
- Therefore, there are no cogent arguments for free will skepticism.
In order to establish premise (1) one must consider particular cases. I start with Strawson’s basic argument. We can discuss the overall argument in more detail in the 3rd week, as well as other arguments.
The ultimacy argument is interesting since it bears similarities to the argument for (epistemological) skepticism as well as the ancient trilemma. Here is a short version of the argument (Strawson 2004, 5; cf. Widerker 2002, 321).
- If determinism is true, then no one is the ultimate source of one’s acts.
- One is morally responsible for one’s acts only if one is their ultimate source.
- Therefore, if determinism is true, no one is morally responsible for one’s acts.
According to Widerker, the first premise depends for its truth on a transfer principle.
(BU) From NU(p) and NU(p --> q) deduce NU(q),
where “NU(p)” means “p and no one is, or ever has been the ultimate source of its being the case that p” (Widerker 2002, 322).
In addition, Strawson’s basic argument bears similarities to the ancient trilemma. Here is a relevant passage.
“You must have intentionally brought it about that you had that nature, N−1,. But in that case, you must have existed already with a prior nature, N−2, in the light of which you intentionally brought it about that you had the nature N−1.
“And so on. Here one is setting off on a potentially infinite regress.” (Strawson 2011, § 3)
Here is another relevant passage.
“… in order to be truly morally responsible for what one does, it seems that one would have to be the ultimate cause or origin of oneself, or at least of some crucial part of one’s mental nature. One would have to be causa sui, in the old terminology. But nothing can be truly or ultimately causa sui in any respect at all.” (Strawson 2011, § 3)
In truth, my real interest is in the relationship between the argument for (epistemological) skepticism and the ancient trilemma. So let me stop here and see if anyone has anything to say. We’ll return to these issues in week 3 in any event. Hopefully then I can fill in some of the gaps.
Thanks for a great 1st week!
Here is the main argument (aka the argument I’ll give on Friday).
1. Arguments for free will skepticism are no better or worse than arguments for epistemological skepticism.
2. If any argument for epistemological skepticism is cogent, then among the things we don’t know is that we don’t know that we don’t have free will.
3. Therefore, there are no cogent arguments for free will skepticism.
- See more at: http://philosophycommons.typepad.com/flickers_of_freedom/#sthash.cBfq2GeI.dpufHere is the main argument (aka the argument I’ll give on Friday).
1. Arguments for free will skepticism are no better or worse than arguments for epistemological skepticism.
2. If any argument for epistemological skepticism is cogent, then among the things we don’t know is that we don’t know that we don’t have free will.
3. Therefore, there are no cogent arguments for free will skepticism.
- See more at: http://philosophycommons.typepad.com/flickers_of_freedom/#sthash.cBfq2GeI.dpufHere is the main argument (aka the argument I’ll give on Friday).
1. Arguments for free will skepticism are no better or worse than arguments for epistemological skepticism.
2. If any argument for epistemological skepticism is cogent, then among the things we don’t know is that we don’t know that we don’t have free will.
3. Therefore, there are no cogent arguments for free will skepticism.
- See more at: http://philosophycommons.typepad.com/flickers_of_freedom/#sthash.cBfq2GeI.dpuf
Joe,
The ultimacy argument is cool, but I’m thinking that it has one fundamental flaw: Instead of using the word “determinism”, it needs to use the word “predeterminism”. Then the argument would be rock solid, and the only issue would be whether or not predeterminism is true (and as you know, I believe it's false…).
The reason I believe the argument needs to use the word “predeterminism”, is because there’s a fundamental difference between the meanings of the words “determinism” and “predeterminism”. Predeterminism advocates that *only* the laws of physics are controlling everything in reality and there's only one possible path, whereas determinism allows the inclusion of “new emergent forces” (i.e., life) to come into the equation, thereby becoming part of what *determines* the path forward.
In other words, if life exerts new forces that affect the path, then the first premise of the ultimacy argument is false, since determinism may be true while at the same time, one may be partially the source of one’s acts.
Posted by: James Laird | 12/07/2013 at 02:56 PM
Joe, I wonder if you think that what I wrote over on the next thread and in my book can be used to get around Strawson’s causa sui argument. Here's the logic. The impossibility of self-causation applies only to changing the physical basis of making a present decision that is realized in or supervenes on that very same physical basis. Self-causation does not apply to changing the physical basis of making a future decision. Neurons, for example, alter the physical grounds, not of present mental events, but of future mental events. Criteria can be set up in advance, such that when they are met, an action follows; this is an action that the agent will have willed to take place by virtue of having set up those particular criteria in advance. At the moment those criteria are satisfied at some unknown point in the future, leading to some action or choice, those criteria cannot be changed, but because criteria can be changed in advance, the agent (e.g. executive circuitry) is free concerning what behaviors/thoughts will occur within limits in the near future. Criteria such as “is a person who has red hair” can be physically realized in neuronal preconditions for firing. A criterial outcome is an outcome that meets certain preset criteria, but what that outcome will be is not foreseeable. For ex., Ronald MacDonald might come to mind. Now, had we run the sequence of events over from the same initial conditions, with the same criteria, we may have ended up with a different outcome, because of noise in the system. Perhaps Margaret Thatcher might have come to mind. Any criterial outcome will meet the criteria preset by the agent, and so will be an outcome that is satisfactory to the agent and partially caused by that agent, but it will also not be a unique solution solely determined by the agent or coerced upon that agent by external forces. So the agent bears some responsibility for the outcome, because the agent set those criteria.
Posted by: Peter Ulric Tse | 12/13/2013 at 05:05 PM
James: I'm not sure I agree about the difference in the meanings between the two terms. I take "determinism" to mean what philosophers of science who work on determinism take it to mean (and what van Inwagen takes it to mean). I can wrap my head around why this might be a bad approach -- thanks mostly to some conversations with Al -- but I still can't think of a better approach.
But "predeterminism"? Your description sounds like physicalism, maybe a kind of physicalist determinism: a complete physical description of the state of the world at sometime in the past together with the laws of nature entails every true proposition. Hopefully, I address some of these concerns below.
Posted by: Joe Campbell | 12/15/2013 at 01:40 AM
Interesting post, Peter. I like the view; I’m inclined to think something like it is true but I’m not sure it gets around Strawson’s argument. Here are some comments. Likely I need to think about this further.
First, you write: “The impossibility of self-causation applies only to changing the physical basis of making a present decision that is realized in or supervenes on that very same physical basis.” I’m not sure this is right. As I see it, Strawson’s argument is more about undermining ultimate responsibility. The idea is that the causal chains leading to your action either flow right through you or never get to you in the first place. The puzzle is about the impossibility of grounding anything that you do in you, which is why I think it is similar to puzzles about grounding knowledge and justification.
Thus, Strawson would likely reject claims like these:
“because criteria can be changed in advance, the agent … is free”
“Any criterial outcome will meet the criteria preset by the agent, and so will be an outcome that is satisfactory to the agent and partially caused by that agent …”
“… the agent bears some responsibility for the outcome, because the agent set those criteria.”
I don’t want to be misunderstood here. Personally I think, like you do, that agents are morally responsible for their actions because they are partial causes; I’m inclined to think that ultimate causation is, if not impossible, at least unlikely given what we know about the physical universe.
But if I understand Strawson’s argument, his claim is that if ultimate responsibility is impossible, then so is partial responsibility. In this way, his argument is similar to the foundationalist’s regress argument. Foundationalism is true (says the foundationalist) because none of the other options work. In order to have knowledge, or adequate justification, foundationalism (ultimate justification if you will) must be true. Strawson takes a similar root and just adds to it that such ultimacy is also impossible.
Posted by: Joe Campbell | 12/16/2013 at 10:59 AM