Responsibility for Omitting and Refraining

Assuming that we're morally responsible for anything, among the things for which we're responsible are actions (helping someone out), events and states that result from actions (someone's suffering), and omitting or refraining from acting (examples to come).

Theories of responsibility commonly focus largely on responsibility for actions, and they often treat responsibility for things of other kinds as deriviative. (This isn't always so, of course; some focus on responsibility for attitudes as the basis for responsibility for actions stemming from those attitudes.) Let's say that one's responsibility for something is derivative just in case it derives from one's responsibility for something else, and one's responsibility for something that isn't derivative is basic.

Question:  Can responsibility for omitting or refraining be basic?

If omitting and refraining were in every case performing some action, we might think the answer was affirmative (though responsibility for an action can be derivative). But omitting and refraining aren't in every case performing some action. Examples: (i) Sometimes I omit to turn out the lights when I leave my office for the day. Turning out the lights when I leave is something I ought to do, it's my policy to do it, and I usually do it, but occasionally I forget. (ii) Someone might, as a matter of policy, omit to remove his hat during the singing of the national anthem. He has a policy of not removing the hat, and he intentionally omits to do so, with no decision needed on each occasion.

When I walk out of my office without turning off the lights, there's some action I'm performing--walking out of the office. And when the fellow stands during the anthem without removing his hat, he's standing. But it isn't plausible that my omission is my walking, and it isn't plausible that the other guy's not removing his hat is his standing. Nor do I see any other actions these omissions might be.

Still, might responsibility for omissions such as these be basic, or should it be seen as deriving from one's responsibility for something else, say, for some actions from which these omissions result?

A problem for the view that it must be derivative is that, in many cases in which we think that agents are responsible for omitting or refraining, responsibility for omitting or refraining can't plausibly be traced to responsibility for prior actions. For example, in the case of my leaving the lights on, it seems that I'm blameworthy (even if only worthy of a tiny bit of blame, and even if no one should ever blame me for this). And if this blameworthiness is derivative, it seems it must trace to my blameworthiness for something else. But it also seems that there might well be no such thing to which my blameworthiness for this omission can plausibly be traced. We might then need to reject many of our responsibility attributions. But it's curious that we're mistaken about so many of these cases.

One problem with the view that responsibility for omitting can be basic is that, in many of these cases, the omission is unwitting. I'm not aware that I'm omitting to turn out the lights, and not aware that I'm doing anything wrong. It seems that there's some kind of awareness requirement for responsibility, and it isn't clear that it's satisfied in this kind of case.

A second problem for this view is that, even in the case of the fellow who intentionally omits to remove his hat, if his omission isn't an action, it isn't clear how any control requirement for responsibility is satisfied.

What do folks think?

Comments

[Nate Stout]

Thanks for this thoughtful post.

I wonder if the most plausible view of the omissions/refrainings you mention here is to see them as derivative of some attitude or disposition rather than a prior action. For example, I might forget to turn out the light because I'm in a hurry to get home for the evening, or because I'm distracted by my cell phone, or because I'm being absentminded and am lost in thinking about a paper I'm working on. Likewise with the case of refusing to remove one's hat. This refraining might derive from my defiant attitude or from my being too vain to show my bad hair day to those around me.

If we think of the cases this way, I don't see anything all that implausible about supposing that I am responsible for being distracted or absentminded. It also seems correct to say that I'm responsible for being defiant or vain in the latter case. There are several stories that we could tell about what this kind of responsibility consists in, but it seems likely to me that these omissions are derivative from an attitude or disposition rather than being basic in the sense that you specify.

[David Shoemaker]

A methodological question, Randy: Suppose we can find no adequate account of derivative responsibility in these cases. Why view the control and epistemic requirements as problems for the view that omitters and refrainers are responsible rather than view their responsibility as problems for the control and epistemic requirements? I confess that my intuitions of their responsibility "feel" stronger than my intuitions about the necessity of control/knowledge.

An unfairly large question, I know, but still....

[Paul Torek]

Nice conundrum.

Why not relax the awareness requirement in a similar way to many legal issues? In the lights-out case, even if you didn't know, you should have known that you were supposed to turn them off. You should have known that they were on, and that you were the last to leave. Parallels to legal negligence might be apt.

I'm puzzled about the control condition and removing one's hat. Can you give a sketch of an argument that suggests a control condition is not met?

[Justin Capes]

Answer: yes.

Solution to problem 1: Not all omissions are unwitting.

Solution to problem 2: the control condition is satisfied if he could have done the thing he omitted to do (and was responsive to reasons, etc.)

[Randolph Clarke]

Nate, sure, we might try the strategy you propose. Some questions about it: If I'm responsible for my omission because it results from some attitude or disposition for which I'm responsible, is my responsibility for that attitude or disposition basic, or does it derive from my responsibility for something else, say, some actions from which it resulted? We might also wonder about awareness requirements for tracing. I'm not aware that my omission is resulting from the attitude or disposition in question. (I might not be aware that I have the disposition.) And, in the case in which I'm blameworthy for the omission, it might be that the attitude isn't one I'm blameworthy for, because there's nothing wrong with me having it. I'm thinking about stopping to get milk on the way home, which I promised my wife I'd do. It's good of me to think about doing things I've promised I'll do. So how does my blameworthiness for the omission derive from my responsibility for an attitude that I'm not blameworthy for having?

David, an entirely fair question. Indeed, I think we ought to adjust the control and awareness conditions so that they give us responsibility in these cases. So, what should they be?

[Randolph Clarke]

Paul, I agree with you. What should the revised awareness requirement say?

Of course, some folks run the argument the other way. We don't have moral responsibility in cases of unwitting omission, because the awareness requirement isn't met, and we don't have criminal responsibility unless we have moral responsibility, so we should revise many of our judgments about criminal responsibility. There are arguments that are advanced for this kind of view that I think have to be met.

About the control condition in the case of not removing one's hat: the fellow has the intention, and he doesn't remove his hat (which is just as he intends), but his failure to remove his hat isn't an action, so in what way is the omission an exercise of control? Perhaps we can say the following: He was able to remove the hat, his having the intention came about in a way that involved no freedom-undermining factors (insanity, brain manipulation, etc.), and his intention figured causally in what he DID do on this occasion (standing with his arms at his sides). But perhaps this leaves out something obvious. What do you see as constituting the agent's control in this case?

Justin, yes, I think that's part of the solution to problem 2. But I think there's more to be said (which I've just sketched).

[Nate Stout]

Thanks for responding, Randy. Those are really good (and helpful) questions. The first two (re: basicness and the awareness requirement) are tough, and I'll have to think more about them.

Regarding the issue of blameworthiness, we might just be able to explain this by saying that the attitude needs to be specified more carefully. So, you may not be blameworthy for thinking about keeping your promise but you may be blameworthy for doing so singlemindedly such that you neglect other things which you have a policy to do. Admittedly, this feels like kind of a dodgy response, but it might work. It's also worth noting that this isn't a problem for omissions only as it may be that blameworthy actions often result from blameless attitudes. A lying promise might be a good example here: Suppose my strong desire to start a charitable organization causes me to lie to a friend about my ability to pay him back for loaning me the start-up money. The desire seems blameless, but the lie is blameworthy (it's not even clear that the desire could be mitigating factor for blameworthiness in this case).

[David Shoemaker]

Randy: One way to get a grip on the relevant sort of "control," or the general sorts of capacities, at issue is by thinking about the type of response to these omissions we would tend to feel and find appropriate. On your own part, in leaving the office lights on, regret or embarrassment; on the part of the cap-omitter, pride. These are likely best thought of as responses to judgment, or what Scanlon calls "self-governance." To the extent the forgetting or the cap-removal-defiance intention were sensitive in some way to judgment, they were "up to" the agent in the way of rational control.

But these sorts of cases also reveal aspects of agential character, for which neither rational nor volitional control may be necessary; rather, all that's needed is a kind of *ownership* of the traits in question, something that may obtain independently of judgment or volition. This might be indicated by the appropriateness of various aretaic responses, such as that the office guy is "forgetful" and the cap wearer is defiant or someone of integrity, and so, respectively, shame or admiration may be rendered appropriate.

[Randolph Clarke]

Nate, I'm inclined to think that blameworthiness hinges on whether you did or didn't respond to moral reasons in the appropriate way. When I tell the lie to get the loan for the charity, there are some moral reasons I'm responding to well, but others I'm not responding to well. So I'd think I'm blameworthy.

David, yes, there are various kinds of responses that might be appropriate in these cases. The control that one needs to have if a certain response is appropriate might well vary depending on the kind of response.

Some think we ought to distinguish different kinds of moral responsibility here. I'm not so sure. I might post something about this a little later in the month.

[Randolph Clarke]

Here's an awareness condition that I propose in OMISSIONS, ch. 7:

Provided that the agent has the capacities that make her a morally responsible agent, she is blameworthy for a wrongful omission that isn't intentional and of which she is unaware if (i) she is free in failing to do the thing in question and (ii) her lack of awareness of her obligation to do it--and of the fact that she isn't doing it--falls below a cognitive standard that applies to her, given her cognitive and volitional abilities and the situation she was in.

The first part here is meant to capture things like: the agent was able to do the thing in question, her not doing it didn't result from freedom-undermining factors such as phobia, brain manipulation, etc.

The second part here is meant to capture an idea that Paul suggested--one that comes up often in these contexts. The agent should have known that she ought to do the thing in question, and should have known that she wasn't doing it. The force of the 'should', I think, is neither that of moral obligation nor that of a mere ideal. (We aren't obligated to have beliefs, and one might be blameless even if ideally one would have realized that one ought to do the thing in question.)

I have a bit more to say about this in the book, but that's the basic idea.