Flickers of Freedom

Revisionism vs. Classical Compatiblism, part II

In conversation, Bert Baumgaertner (UI) and Michael Goldsby (WSU) have suggested another way of contrasting my view with Vargas’ view.

First, there is revisionism 1.0: Who cares what the folk think? What matters is what philosophers think, for “free will” is a term of art. Next there is revisionism 1.1: The folk conception of free will is different from the concept we should adopt but we should adopt philosophical compatibilism. This is Vargas’ view. Lastly, there is revisionism 1.2: The folk conception of free will is generally speaking the concept we should adopt but it needs some tweaking here and there. This is Nahmias’ view. Ultimately the difference between Vargas and me is that I lean more toward revisionism 1.2 and even 1.0 than revisionism 1.1.

Manuel suggests that version 1.0 isn't a version of revisionism at all. Perhaps it is best characterized as anti-revisionist and the real debate is between versions 1.1 and 1.2.

Here is where I get confused and uncomfortable. I want to say that there is a core concept of free will that is aligned with sourcehood or the ability to do otherwise or whatever -- something neutral wrt to the compatibility problem. Any supposed connections between the core concept and incompatibilism (or compatibilism, for that matter) are the result of fallacious reasoning.

Can I say this? It isn't clear what would count as evidence for such a claim.

Varieties of Skepticism: Free Will & Knowledge

Here is the main argument (aka the argument I’ll give on Friday).

1. Arguments for free will skepticism are no better or worse than arguments for epistemological skepticism.

2. If any argument for epistemological skepticism is cogent, then among the things we don’t know is that we don’t know that we don’t have free will.

3. Therefore, there are no cogent arguments for free will skepticism.

Today and tomorrow I provide support for premise 1. Premise 2 is clearly true.

I was unsuccessful in establishing my first thesis: All arguments for free will skepticism are parasitic on arguments for incompatibilism. There were at least two potential counterexamples to this claim: Double’s argument and Levy’s argument. This complicates my support for premise 1.

In order to motivate premise 1, we must first establish commonalities between arguments for free will skepticism and arguments for epistemological skepticism. Toward this end, consider 4 types of argument for epistemological skepticism.

I. The argument for (epistemological) skepticism is a contemporary argument for the conclusion that no one knows anything. Descartes, Moore, and Putnam (among others) offer versions of the argument. It is the argument we likely have in mind when we refer to films like The Matrix to support of our (epistemically) skeptical intuitions. The formal structure of the argument for skepticism is controversial but here is a plausible interpretation.

• S does not know that not-H.
• If S knows that O, then S knows that not-H.
• So, S does not know that O.

Let S be any person, O be any ordinary belief, and H be some skeptical hypothesis. Then the argument form suggests that for any person and any ordinary belief, there is a skeptical hypothesis that epistemically undermines the belief.

For instance, you might think that you have a hand (ordinary belief). But you could be a brain-in-a-vat (BIV; skeptical hypothesis). You don’t know that you’re not a BIV – after all, the evidence would be the same either way. Thus, you don’t know that you have a hand. If you knew that you had a hand, then you could rule out that you were a BIV, for BIVs don’t have hands. Yet you can’t rule that out.

Premise (2) is supported by an epistemic closure principle. The actual principle is controversial but here is a plausible version. Let Kp = p is knowable:

• Kp
• K(p --> q)
• So, Kq

This bears some similarity to Beta-like transfer principles.

[Side note: I’m interested in knowing whether anyone thinks that this is a fair rendering of the argument for skepticism.]

II. The ancient trilemma: This discussion is saved for tomorrow. There are strong similarities between Strawson’s argument and the ancient trilemma.

III & IV: Luck arguments and metaphilosophical arguments: I won’t spend any more time this week discussing these issues – which is a shame since Neil’s work and Double's work are original and compelling contributions to the literature. I’ll get back to Neil in week 3, and maybe even Richard. I brought Richard’s book home with me, so I might get a chance! Here are just a few superficial comparisons worthy of further consideration.

First, worries about epistemological luck are pervasive. Arguments from epistemological luck to epistemological skepticism are equally pervasive.

Second, with Double there are difficulties. For one thing, it is not clear that Richard’s view is a version of free will skepticism – and I’m just talking about the view in Metaphilosophy and Free Will (1996). This view is similar to Peter Unger’s view in Philosophical Relativity (1984). In an important sense, both views go beyond skepticism. In as much as they are a kind of skepticism, Unger gives arguments against knowledge as well as against free will.

Libet and No-Choice Closure

There are new arguments for free will skepticism based on recent findings in neuroscience. For instance, most of you know about a compelling set of data from experiments performed by Benjamin Libet and others (see Bayne and Haggard in Swinburne 2011, as well as the Introduction). In a Libet experiment, a subject is asked to perform some simple motor action, say flexing her wrist, at some particular time of her choosing. The subject is then requested to identify the time at which she is first consciously aware of her decision (or intention) to flex her wrist. Studies reveal preparatory brain activity called a “readiness potential”: a neural event or set of events that precede conscious choice yet is highly correlated with a particular action. Given common sense assumptions, free will appears to be an illusion, for decisions are fixed prior to conscious choice; conscious choice appears to play no role in one’s decisions.

There is much disagreement about what the Libet experiments actually prove and there are several criticisms that one might give to any argument for free will scepticism based on these findings (Balaguer 2010; Bayne 2011; Mele forthcoming and other works). What interests me is whether these findings present a new challenge to free will, something fundamentally different from more traditional challenges resulting from various compatibility problems.

Most philosophers believe that conscious choice has a neurological basis. Thus, there is likely some physical event or set of events in the causal chain leading from the readiness potential to the action that is token identical to the agent’s conscious choice. The view is that this choice is nonetheless bypassed and plays no causal role, so it is no choice at all. Yet why believe that the physical event that is the agent’s conscious choice plays no causal role in the agent’s action?

One way to reach this conclusion is to incorporate a no-choice closure principle. For instance, let Np = p and no one has a choice about whether p; let P₀ = readiness potential RP occurs; let P = action A occurs. Here is one way to understand the argument:

NP₀

N(P₀ --> P)

So, NP

This argument explicitly depends on the no-choice closure principle Beta (van Inwagen 1983). On this telling of the story, it seems like the “new” challenge to free will is not so new after all. At the very least it seems to incorporate a substantive principle used in the consequence argument.

Is there a better way to understand the argument, one that does not rely on no-choice closure principles?

Incompatibilism and Free Will Skepticism

Thanks Thomas for giving me this opportunity! I look forward to discussing free will and moral responsibility with all of  you over the next few weeks!

In this first week, I’ll note several reasons why compatibility problems – the problem of free will and determinism as well as the problem of moral responsibility and determinism – are still important, contrary to the views of many contemporary philosophers. On Friday, I’ll string these various posts together to provide a provocative argument for the claim that there is no cogent argument for free will skepticism (Campbell 2011, 5.4).

In order to reach this conclusion, I need to first establish that some form of incompatibilism is a presumption if not an explicit premise in any argument for free will skepticism. For instance, Derk Pereboom’s case for free will skepticism includes a version of the manipulation argument, which is an argument for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and determinism (2001).

Even in Galen Strawson’s basic argument for skepticism about ultimate (moral) responsibility (1986, 2011), incompatibilism plays an essential role. In some versions of the argument, Strawson makes no obvious mention of either determinism or indeterminism, which leads some to think the argument is independent of the compatibilism/incompatibilism or determinism/indeterminism debates. Yet if you look closely it turns out that Strawson’s argument takes the form of a constructive dilemma. He first argues that ultimate (moral) responsibility is incompatible with determinism and then shows that indeterminism can’t help (Campbell 2011, 1.5; 3.4; 4.3). For instance, after giving the main argument, Strawson (2011) writes the following:

“(vi) This may not be the whole story, for it may be that some changes in the way one is are traceable to the influence of indeterministic or random factors. But (vii) it is foolish to suppose that indeterministic or random factors, for which one is ex hypothesi in no way responsible, can in themselves contribute to one’s being truly or ultimately responsible for how one is.” (http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/V014SECT3)

“It may be proposed that the agent-self decides as it does partly or wholly because of the presence of indeterministic occurrences in the decision process. But it is clear that indeterministic occurrences can never be a source of true (moral) responsibility.” (http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/V014SECT6)

Obviously showing that TWO arguments for skepticism about moral responsibility presuppose the truth of incompatibilism falls short of showing that incompatibilism is an essential claim in all arguments for free will skepticism and skepticism about moral responsibility. But one must start somewhere!

I’m interested in seeing what you think about my interpretation of Strawson’s basic argument and whether you think there are any incompatiblism-independent arguments for free will skepticism or skepticism about moral responsibility that I have not considered. I have another, even more controversial, example that I’ll offer tomorrow.

Passing the Torch

It is once again time to pass the torch from one Featured Author to the next.  But first, I just wanted to thank Tamler for an engaging and illuminating month of posting.  As always, the discussion threads were both fruitful and fun. That said, it is time to hand over the reigns to December's Featured Author--Joseph Keim Campbell. Joe is Professor of Politics, Philosophy, and Public Affairs at Washington State University. His research interests include metaphysics, epistemology, history of modern philosophy, and philosophy of science. Professor Campbell recently published Free Will (Polity 2011) and he has also co-edited several collections for MIT Press (I have linked to two of them in the sidebar).  

Needless to say, I am excited to see what Professor Campbell comes up with for the readers of the blog. However, I do want to point out that we are trying out a new format this month for the Featured Author series.  Professor Campbell will post during the first and third weeks (leaving the second and fourth weeks for other contributors to post).  While I have gotten a lot of positive feedback concerning the F.A. series here at Flickers, I have also had several people suggest that the format discourages others from posting.  Since that was never my intention--that is, I didn't mean to turn Flickers into just a F.A. blog--we thought we would switch things up a bit this month.  So, if you have a post you have been wanting to share with the community but you have been hesitant to step on the Featured Author's proverbial toes, then now is your chance!  The second and fourth weeks are open for others to have their hand at kicking up the philosophical dust here at Flickers.  

So, please take advantage of this opportunity.  If this change in format doesn't encourage non-F.A.s to contribute, then I may switch the format yet again so that we have a F.A. every other month.  Either way, I just wanted everyone to know that I meant for this blog to give all contributors a chance to share their views, posts, etc.  That the F.A. series has detracted from this goal has been a lamentable side effect of the success of the series!  But now that the F.A. series has established itself as perhaps the most exciting recent development in philosophical blogging, I think the time is ripe to tinker with the format a bit.  So, please take advantage if you're one of the contributors who has been hesitant to post for the past year!

That's it for now!  Thanks again to Tamler for an exciting November and thanks in advance to Joe for what I am sure will be an interesting December.  The tentative upcoming schedule for the F.A. series can be found below the fold.