Assuming that we're morally responsible for anything, among the things for which we're responsible are actions (helping someone out), events and states that result from actions (someone's suffering), and omitting or refraining from acting (examples to come).
Theories of responsibility commonly focus largely on responsibility for actions, and they often treat responsibility for things of other kinds as deriviative. (This isn't always so, of course; some focus on responsibility for attitudes as the basis for responsibility for actions stemming from those attitudes.) Let's say that one's responsibility for something is derivative just in case it derives from one's responsibility for something else, and one's responsibility for something that isn't derivative is basic.
Question: Can responsibility for omitting or refraining be basic?
If omitting and refraining were in every case performing some action, we might think the answer was affirmative (though responsibility for an action can be derivative). But omitting and refraining aren't in every case performing some action. Examples: (i) Sometimes I omit to turn out the lights when I leave my office for the day. Turning out the lights when I leave is something I ought to do, it's my policy to do it, and I usually do it, but occasionally I forget. (ii) Someone might, as a matter of policy, omit to remove his hat during the singing of the national anthem. He has a policy of not removing the hat, and he intentionally omits to do so, with no decision needed on each occasion.
When I walk out of my office without turning off the lights, there's some action I'm performing--walking out of the office. And when the fellow stands during the anthem without removing his hat, he's standing. But it isn't plausible that my omission is my walking, and it isn't plausible that the other guy's not removing his hat is his standing. Nor do I see any other actions these omissions might be.
Still, might responsibility for omissions such as these be basic, or should it be seen as deriving from one's responsibility for something else, say, for some actions from which these omissions result?
A problem for the view that it must be derivative is that, in many cases in which we think that agents are responsible for omitting or refraining, responsibility for omitting or refraining can't plausibly be traced to responsibility for prior actions. For example, in the case of my leaving the lights on, it seems that I'm blameworthy (even if only worthy of a tiny bit of blame, and even if no one should ever blame me for this). And if this blameworthiness is derivative, it seems it must trace to my blameworthiness for something else. But it also seems that there might well be no such thing to which my blameworthiness for this omission can plausibly be traced. We might then need to reject many of our responsibility attributions. But it's curious that we're mistaken about so many of these cases.
One problem with the view that responsibility for omitting can be basic is that, in many of these cases, the omission is unwitting. I'm not aware that I'm omitting to turn out the lights, and not aware that I'm doing anything wrong. It seems that there's some kind of awareness requirement for responsibility, and it isn't clear that it's satisfied in this kind of case.
A second problem for this view is that, even in the case of the fellow who intentionally omits to remove his hat, if his omission isn't an action, it isn't clear how any control requirement for responsibility is satisfied.
What do folks think?
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