A little while ago, I put up a post about what research in experimental philosophy has discovered about the intuitions of philosophical experts. In the time since then, there have actually been a few more studies on this topic, so I thought it might be a good idea to put up a revised list.
I'm not sure if others would agree, but my own sense is that we have now reached the point where we have so much systematic empirical research on philosophical expertise that it is no longer intellectually responsible to try addressing these issues without grappling in some way with the findings. A couple of years ago, it would have been very reasonable to make claims about philosophical expertise just by drawing on anecdotal experience or general theories from cognitive science, but now that we have this impressive wealth of real data on how philosophical experts make judgments, it seems like any serious attempt to understand these questions will have to take account of the data in some way or other.
In any case, here is the latest list. Please be sure to let me know if there is anything further I should be adding.
- The intuitions of ordinary folks showed an order effect. The intuitions of philosophers showed exactly the same order effect, but unlike ordinary folks, philosophers were able to develop principles that justified whichever pattern of intuitions they held.
Knobe, J. & Samuels, R. (2013). Thinking Like a Scientist: Innateness as a Case Study. Cognition. 126: 72-86.
- Ordinary folks gave different answers depending on whether they are presented with each vignette separately or given both vignettes together. Philosophers made exactly the same error.
Sytsma, J. & Machery, E. (2010). Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience. Philosophical Studies, 151(2): 299-327.
- Philosophers were asked a question about consciousness and also asked how ordinary folks would respond. Philosophers gave different answers from ordinary folks but also mistakenly attributed to the folk a view that was more like their own.
Dunnaway, B., Edmonds, A., and Manley, D. (forthcoming). The Folk Probably Do Think What You Think They Think. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
- Philosophers were asked to predict the results of experimental philosophy studies in which the outcome had been alleged to be 'surprising.' Philosophers were highly accurate in making these predictions.
Machery, E. (2012). Expertise and intuitions about reference. Theoria.
- Results tentatively suggest that linguists' and philosophers' intuitions about reference are influenced by their disciplinary background.
Stotz, K., Linquist, S., Griffiths, P., and Machery, E. (ms). Expert representations of innateness. (Order of the authors to be determined.)
- Intuitions about innateness were not influenced by disciplinary affiliation across a wide range of scientific fields.
Tobia, K., Buckwalter, W., & Stich, S. (forthcoming). Moral intuitions: Are philosophers experts? Philosophical Psychology.
- Both ordinary folks and philosophers show a difference between second-person and third-person cases.
Schwitzgebel, E. & Cushman, F. (unpublished data). Second-Person vs. Third-Person Presentations of Moral Dilemmas.
- Ordinary folks show a difference between second-person and third-person intuitions; philosophers show no such difference.
Tobia, K. (forthcoming). Cleanliness is Next to Morality, Even for Philosophers. Journal of Consciousness Studies.
- Both ordinary folks and professional philosophers were impacted by the actual smell of the questionnaire they were answering (specifically, whether it smelled of Lysol).
Kuntz, J.R. & Kuntz, J.R.C. (2011). Surveying philosophers about philosophical intuition. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2: 643-665.
Livengood, J., Sytsma, J., Feltz, A., Scheines, R. & Machery, E. (2009). Philosophical Temperament. Philosophical Psychology, 23: 313-330.
Schulz, E., Cokely, E.T., & Feltz, A. (2011). Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: A test of the Expertise Defense. Consciousness and Cognition, 20, 1722-1731.
Vaesen, K. & Peterson, M. The Reliability of Armchair Intuitions. Unpublished draft.