Philosophical Expertise?

There is no such thing.

I have a paper on the expertise defense forthcoming in Metaphilosophy that may be of interest to readers of the blog.

Three Arguments against the Expertise Defense

Experimental philosophers have challenged friends of the expertise defense to show that (a) the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are different from the intuitive judgments of non-philosophers, and (b) the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are better than the intuitive judgments of non-philosophers, in ways that are relevant to the truth or falsity of such judgments. Friends of the expertise defense have responded by arguing that the burden of proof lies with experimental philosophers. In this paper, I sketch three arguments which show that both (a) and (b) are probably false. If my arguments are cogent, then shifting the burden of proof is a futile move, since philosophical training makes no significant difference as far as making intuitive judgments in response to hypothetical cases in concerned.